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when we die. Without such indelibly human vulnerabilities a large percentage of the population likely will not accept it. Countless human-tohuman relationships fall apart precisely because one or both parties are
unsure if the other person is sincere in their feelings for them. Centuries
of anxiety about ‘true love’ cannot be dissolved in a black-box, no matter how convincing the outputs are. While there is much that we don’t
understand about what it means for one human being to love another,
only the most jaded believe it to be utterly impossible for us to do so. By
contrast, the belief that machines can only pretend to feel anything for
their human companions will not only be the default position, I strongly
suspect it will be a very recalcitrant one as well.
Perhaps nothing will ever bridge that gap for many people, but if
anything can it must surely involve a deep understanding of just what
emotions are beyond sets of behaviors that we associate with them. It is
arguably unfair to criticize Yonck for not treating this problem (which
could easily consume several volumes by itself) with sufficient depth,
when the book clearly aims to survey more than spelunk. Nonetheless,
given the objective of the book to forecast “our future in a world of artificial emotional intelligence,” failing to tackle such a deep and abiding
problem in at least a chapter-length treatment seems like more than just
a missed opportunity.

Garret Merriam
California State University, Sacramento
Correspondence: merriam@csus.edu

Medieval Sensibilities: A History of Emotions in the Middle Ages. Damien Boquet
and Piroska Nagy, Cambridge: Polity, 2018, xiii + 364pp. $28.95 pbk. ISBN:
978-150954663

Medieval Sensibilities: A History of Emotions in the Middle Ages by
Damien Boquet and Piroska Nagy covers vast areas of Western Medieval
times to show that emotions or sensibility was core to their conception
of human life. The authors aim to question and dismantle both the longstanding view that emotions do not deserve the attention of the serious
historian and the grand narrative view that the European Middle Ages
was akin to adolescence in human beings and Europeans eventually grew
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up and organized themselves by reason via centralized political rule in
the Modern epoch. They trace the role of emotions that shaped both the
lives and political world from the early monastic enclaves after Augustine to the princes of the late Medieval period. The detail is breathtaking
and the scholarship impressive. I am in no position to judge or do justice
to the detail of the historical wealth the book contains. I can add that I
am sympathetic to some aspects of their project. But some of their analysis of philosophical texts and the conclusions they reach from them I
find questionable, and the strength and support they provide their thesis
I view to be weak and conflicting. Finally, I see their commitment to a
history of emotions as an autonomous project to be untenable but as part
of the project of history itself I fully agree.
Although my review is mainly negative, I think that their historical
argumentation in the book supports a weaker thesis and one consistent
with their aims mentioned above. The authors show that emotions are
fluid over time and, most importantly, have a social context from which
they are understood, but their explicit thesis is much stronger than these
claims: “we are convinced that emotion was at the heart of the anthropology of the Western Middle Ages” (7). I argue that this thesis, along with
aims of the work, either proves too much, too little, and possibly not
much at all. One core problem they have with their arguments is overlooking the role reason has in human life and solely focusing on emotion and affectivity instead of the interplay between the two. Their view
would be better defended if they showed carefully how views on emotion
shaped the very conception and use of reason for the people and communities they discuss. Instead, they leave us with only half of the head of
these Medieval thinkers and their communities.
First, their thesis proves too much. Boquet and Nagy argue against
the view of Norbert Elias and his civilizing process, the idea that emotions are mastered under a “governing principle of rationality” (4) that
arose through a certain kind of political rule and organization. Certain
emotions or expressions of emotions in the modern context, according
to Elias, would be deemed immature and childlike. The authors attempt
to show that emotions in the Western Medieval period had their own
rationality. But those thinkers sympathetic with Elias’s thesis could simply claim that, if emotion were at the heart of anthropology at this time,
this is consistent with their thesis of the immaturity of this age. This is
no more clear than their analysis King Edward III conquering of Calais
and his subsequent pardoning of the six notable townsmen, which he
planned to execute as a deal to spare the rest of the town, by request
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of the emotional outpouring of his own pregnant wife, Queen Philippa
(218–20). The authors’ aim here is to display the use of “emotional community” as a powerful tool in grasping historical events, which I do not
dispute, but the event itself shows the kind of contrast Elias holds to be
relevant between a Medieval community and the rational organization
of the modern state through the means of the King’s court. Edward’s actions are brought about by a conflicting set of emotions, anger and hatred
to destroy the city and soothing love to let those he wanted executed to
live, rather than some long-term plan discovered by reason or even some
conception of justice. What is not clarified here, as far as I can tell, is the
rationality present in the emotions that motivated Edward’s actions. This
is the issue I turn to now.
But this is where the authors’ thesis proves too little. To defend their
thesis, they appeal to the passion of Christ and God’s love. No doubt
these are both important to understand the emotions and the anthropology of this time, but the appeal falls short since at least God’s love was
not solely understood as an emotion or affect. Core to their argument is
the analysis of emotions and affectivity in respect to the understanding
of virtue and vice, sin, for key Western Medieval thinkers, which appear
mainly in Ch. 1 and 6 of their book. Augustine, they show, subsumed
emotions under the will, part of his trinity of the human soul, and rightfully showed that this influenced the view that emotions were an invitation for introspection. But Boquet and Nagy move from this to the view
that emotions were restored to rationality (25) and yet even further to
the view that “Christian man of the Middle Ages would be emotional,
or he would be nothing at all!” (30) In Ch. 6, focusing again on the role
of emotions to virtue and vice, they conclude “man’s moral path lay in
fulfilling his nature, in being an emotive creature endowed with reason”
(135). I do not see the support for these moves. It is not that emotions
were not integral to the discussion of ethics, this is true for both the
Ancient Greeks and Hellenistic thinkers. But reason seems more central
for Augustine’s morality, specifically, what is the proper order of the soul
(City of God, Bk. XIX, esp. Ch. 13). Part of the proper order of the soul is
to grasp the law and what to command the will to do. The authors would
need to argue that emotivity was central to the law for Augustine, in
part, because the introspection of emotions is only possible in respect to
conforming or falling short of moral law. But I do not see that being so.
A similar problem arises for their thesis with Aquinas’ thought. If morality has to do with having the virtues, then their view is also ruled out
by Aquinas explicitly, who argues that a virtue is not a passion (Summa
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Theologiae, Question LXI, Article 1). The very next article makes clear
what the debate about the relation of the passions to virtue is (whether
Aquinas’ answer is consistent with Augustine’s is not the issue but rather
whether the issue being debated is framed similarly): whether the virtues
are intellectual and without passion or whether passions are present with
the virtues. Augustine and Aquinas answer the latter. In other words,
being a rational animal, human virtue orders the passions of the soul
correctly or well.
The biggest challenge of their work is what they admit directly: there
is little agreement about what should be included as an emotion. They
appeal to the term “sensibility,” which they clarify as follows. “We speak
often of feelings, of passions, of affects, and of impulses. But affectivity also includes more stable aspects: atmospheres, moods, and lasting
dispositions” (6–7). Including lasting dispositions is what gets them in
trouble. If your view of emotions is so broad as to include something that
is clearly ruled out as a passion or emotion, at least by many of the people
you are writing a history of, since a virtue is a lasting disposition, then
your thesis does not prove much at all. Your use of a term sneaks in what
is controversial (and possibly the conclusion they try to reach).
This ends my discussion of the philosophical merits of their thesis.
There is also some interest in their claim of the history of emotions as a
viable project. Their work itself shows merit in the project. But they also
seem to claim too much here as well. They assert that their work “has
shed light on some of the affective characteristics of medieval societies
and their capacity to define hierarchies” (249). This seems to me to be a
category mistake. I can only see how affective characteristics are used as
content in a hierarchy, not to define it. Hierarchies are defined by a principle or principles of order. This involves reason or some form of cognition (and not just a cognition of an emotional experience or state). But
this mistake, I think, produces many of the problems I have pointed out
above. It also points to another problem not yet mentioned of their work.
There is a live question whether emotions themselves are as malleable as
they suggest. As Socrates points out to Callicles in the Gorgias, if affections (pathos) were not held in common we could not communicate our
experiences to each other (481c–d). If emotions or sensibility were as malleable as the authors suggest, Socrates’ view here implies that history itself
would be a hard discipline to practice. I do agree with the authors that
emotions play a very different role in the lives of Western Medieval people
than they do for those living in the 20th or 21st century, and this is not
only important to recognize, we might fail doing any history justice if we
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did not acknowledge this. Like Boquet and Nagy, I too hold that emotions
often play a key role in human communication and so play a social role in
how we live our lives. Emotions are not mere private phenomena of human life. But I suggest here that it is more the interplay of social structures
and concepts of social living with emotions that make human life be very
malleable and not constant across time, so the same or similar emotions
in one society play a different social role in another. Much like the Aristotelian view of human action and human virtue cannot be reduced to
principles of reason or emotions, so the same can be said about human life
and how we understand it. Trying to reduce all that is valuable in history
and human life to one side or the other leaves us with half of a head or, as
Ancient and Medieval thinkers would say, half of a soul.

Chad Wiener
Old Dominion University

Correspondence: cwiener@odu.edu
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With the creation of the internet and social media, we are fed misinformation at an unprecedented pace. Yet, promising to endow readers with
a much-needed roadmap to navigate the twists and turns of what many
have called the “post-truth” era of American and English politics, Simon
Blackburn’s exceptional monograph On Truth provides a careful analysis
of truth, our access to it, and its authority. The task in the first half of
the book is to articulate and analyze historically important theories of
truth, while the second half is concerned with applying theoretical tools
obtained in part I to areas where truth is often purported to be absent,
such as in judgments of beauty, ethics, and religion. In addition to recommending this resource to the public, I also highly recommend On
Truth to academics, as philosophers and other academics have played
a non-negligible role in generating rampant skepticism and relativism
throughout the population.
In Part I, Blackburn approaches this project in the way that a chef
approaches a stew: by gathering fragments of theories of truth and
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